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ABSTRAK 
Rezim pajak negara ASEAN dapat dibedakan menjadi rezim pajak klasikal (Indonesia, Thailand, dan 
Filipina) dan rezim pajak terintegrasi (Singapura, Malaysia, dan Vietnam). Makalah ini ditujukan 
untuk memahami pengaruh perbedaan rezim pajak negara terhadap penggunaan hutang 
perusahaan. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode regresi cross section. Variabel 
terikat, yaitu struktur modal perusahaan diwakili oleh Debt to Equity Ratio, variabel bebas diwakili 
oleh variable dummy, dimana rezim pajak klasikal didefinisikan bernilai 1 dan rezim pajak 
terintegrasi didefinisikan bernilai 0, dan variable kendali sebagai berikut: Net Property Plan and 
Equipment to Total Asset Ratio, One Year Sales Growth, Price to Book Value Ratio, dan Earnings 
before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to Total Asset Ratio. Hasil regresi 
menunjukkan perusahaan yang berada pada negara dengan rezim pajak klasikal menggunakan 
hutang yang lebih sedikit daripada perusahaan yang berada pada negara dengan rezim pajak 
terintegrasi. Tarif pajak pada rezim pajak klasikal lebih besar daripada tarif pajak rezim pajak 
terintegrasi. Tarif pajak yang lebih tinggi memberikan kesempatan penghematan pajak yang lebih 
besar pada perusahaan pada rezim pajak klasikal daripada perusahaan pada rezim pajak 
terintegrasi. Perusahaan pada rezim pajak klasikal dapat memperoleh penghematan pajak yang 
sama besarnya dengan perusahaan pada rezim pajak terintegrasi dengan menggunakan sumber 
dana hutang yang lebih kecil.  
Kata kunci: Rezim Pajak Klasikal; Rezim Pajak Terintegrasi; Penghematan Pajak Dari Hutang; 
Pendanaan Hutang; Negara ASEAN 
ABSTRACT 
The ASEAN country’s tax regime can be distinguished into the classical tax regime (Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Philippines) and integrated tax regime (Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam). This 
paper aims to understand the effect of the different tax regimes to firm debt financing policy. We 
analyze the effects of different tax regimes using the cross section regression method. The 
dependent variable is Debt to Equity Ratio, the independent variable is proxied by a dummy 
variable with the classical tax regime are defined as 1 and the integrated tax regime are defined 
as 0, and firms’ characteristics, as a control variable: Net Property Plan and Equipment to Total 
Asset Ratio, One Year Sales Growth, Price to Book Value Ratio, and Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization to Total Asset Ratio. Since the classical tax regime has higher tax 
rates relative to the integrated tax regime, firm operating in the classical tax regime able to 
experience the same debt tax saving using lower debt financing relative to firm operating in the 
integrated tax regime.  
Keywords: ClassicalTtax Regime; Integrated Tax Regime; Debt Tax Saving; Debt Financing; 
ASEAN Country  




Attaining high economic growth to alleviate poverty and increase prosperity are the 
government’s main economics objectives. Government devise economic strategies to achieve the 
objectives with two main considerations. The economic strategy should be sustainable and could 
achieved the objectives within shortest time period possible. One strategy is to use tax policy to 
alter firm debt financing decision. Government allow firm to treat interest expense as part of firm’s 
production cost. This tax policy effectively reduce firm taxable profit and lower firm tax obligation. 
This policy also known as debt tax saving. This policy also effectively provide incentives for firms 
to use more debt financing. 
Economic growth supported by debt financing tends to be higher and have a longer 
business cycle. Economic growth supported by debt financing, specifically excess leverage as 
opposed to fundamental leverage, tends to create excesses and asset bubbles (Zhang et al., 2018). 
Asset bubbles always burst and bring severe financial crisis.  
Financial crisis induced by excessive debt financing may become more prolonged and 
more severe. It may cut attained economic achievement back to historical conditions, or worse. 
The financial crisis induced by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-2008 crystallized the 
government views regarding the trustworthiness of market mechanisms in investment that 
supported by debt financing.  
Government and central banks, while operated independently, also consider each other to 
reduce business cycle amplitude and prolong economic growth. Government reduce the firm’s 
incentives to use debt financing by reducing tax subsidy. Belgium introduced Notional Interest 
Deduction that effectively reduce the benefit of debt tax saving and increase the benefit of equity 
financing (Schepens, 2016). Germany, French, Sweden, and United Kingdom introduced tax 
systems that differentiate tax treatment for secured debt and unsecured debt (Diemer, 2017). 
Central banks also put higher effort to reduce bank systemic risk by reducing the incentive to use 
higher leverage (Andrieş & Nistor, 2016; Beirne & Friedrich, 2017; Mensah & Premaratne, 2017).  
In general, countries tax policy or tax regimes can be categorized as the classical tax 
regime and integrated tax regime. The classical tax regime assesses firm income tax obligation 
and shareholder income tax obligation separately. This separate assessment results in double 
taxation for the shareholder. The classical tax regime entitles shareholder to firm tax obligation 
and dividend tax obligation. The integrated tax regime jointly assesses firm income tax obligation 
and shareholder income tax obligation, which results in only single taxation for the shareholder. 
The integrated tax regime only tax shareholder at firm level not at individual level. If the firm 
already paid their tax obligation, the shareholder that received dividend from the firm do not need 
to pay tax dividend.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2018) shows that ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations) countries adopt different tax regime. ASEAN country that adopt the classical tax regime 
tend to have higher tax rates than country that adopt the integrated tax regime. See table 1. 








Indonesia 25% 15% Classical 




Thailand 20% 20% Classical 
Phillippines 30% 30% Classical 
Malaysia 25% 0% Integrated 
Singapore 17% 0% Integrated 
Vietnam 22% 0% Integrated 
Myanmar 35% 0% Integrated 
Cambodia* 20% 14% Classical 
Brunei 
Darussalam* 
20% 0% Integrated 
Laos* 24% 10% Classical 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2018) 
Note: * means not included in analysis due to firm financial data issues. 
Based on different tax regime that mentioned earlier, this paper is motivated to 
understand the implications of different tax regime to firm debt financing decision. Current 
research mostly analyze the level of tax rates to capital structure decision and focuses only on one 
aspect of shareholder tax obligation, either at the firm level, i.e. corporate tax or shareholder level, 
or dividend tax. Fischer and Jensen (2019) discuss the importance of higher debt tax shield, which 
implicitly related to higher tax rates, to firm higher debt level. Higher debt tax shield provide firm 
with higher Return on Equity because their capital structure is dominated by debt financing 
(Armenter & Hnatkovska, 2017; Faulkender & Smith, 2016; Gao, 2016; Heider & Ljungqvist, 2015; 
Qi, 2011; Schandlbauer, 2017; Tse & Rodgers, 2011).  Macnamara (2019) discuss the trend of 
declining tax rates across countries that have effect to lower firm debt level. Lin and Flannery 
(2013) examined shareholder personal tax treatment effect to firm debt financing decision. The 
classical tax regime that have dividend tax obligation and the integrated tax regime that have zero 
dividend tax obligation. The different tax regime have different effects on firm shareholder after 
tax returns and eventually on firm’s payout policy, i.e., cash dividend and share repurchases 
(Baker et al., 2002; Bonaimé et al., 2016; Jiang et al.,2013).  
Our understanding of the effect of different tax regime to firm debt financing decision is 
relatively limited. The tax regime analysis ensure that we simultaneously focus on both aspect of 
shareholder taxation, firm level, and shareholder level tax. One research that closely related to our 
research is Temimi, Zeitun, and Mimouni (2016). They discuss the importance of controlling 
countries tax regime to understand firm debt financing decision. Countries tax regime have 
different effect, significant or insignificant effect, to different industries.  
As findings on the effect of tax rates to debt financing decision is relatively mixed, our 
research question: Does country tax regime (classical tax regime and integrated tax regime) have 
effects on firm debt financing decisions? We hypothesized that country tax regime have effects on 
firm’s debt financing decisions. The hypothesis is tested using the cross section regression method 
for firm’s operating in ASEAN countries. The dependent variable is Debt to Equity Ratio as a proxy 
for the firm’s debt financing decision. The independent variable is a dummy variable with the 
classical tax regime are defined as 1 and the integrated tax regime are defined as 0. According to 
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Zingales and Rajan (1995), we use control variables as follows: Net Property Plan and Equipment 
to Total Asset Ratio as a proxy for firm asset tangibility, One Year Sales Growth as a proxy for firm 
current growth rate, Price to Book Value Ratio as a proxy for firm expected future growth rate, 
and Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to Total Asset Ratio as a proxy 
for firm profitability. 
We choose to analyze the tax regime in ASEAN countries for two reasons. First, ASEAN is 
an economic trade bloc with growing importance (Song, 2010). Second, ASEAN countries tax 
regime can be categorized into the classical tax regime and the integrated tax regime. This paper 
will thus contribute by provide empirical evidence on the effects of country tax regime, the 
classical tax regime and the integrated tax regime, on firm debt financing decision.  
This research is also very timely. The trend for tax competition is getting intensified 
(Becker & Fuest, 2012; Han et al., 2014; Sanz-Córdoba, 2019; Suzuki, 2014). Several countries 
start to adopt the integrated tax regime. For instance, Indonesia government has reduced the 
public firm’s tax rate from 25% in 2019 to 19% in 2020 and 2021 and 17% in 2022. Indonesia 
government also waive tax on dividend payment in 2021. The Indonesia government tax policy 
effectively match Indonesia tax rates, firm tax rates and dividend tax rates, to Singapore’s firm tax 
rate 17% and dividend tax rate 0%. The Indonesia government also effectively transtioned from 
the classical tax regime into the integrated tax regime. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
There are three drivers of economic growth: productivity growth, accumulation of capital, 
and accumulation of labor (Cobb & Douglas, 2007; Solow, 2014). Among these drivers, the 
accumulation of capital is seen as the most important driver for developing countries. Developing 
countries usually already possess plenty of labor, but lack of capital. Hence, a country may enjoy 
higher productivity gain if additional capital is provided  (Compagnucci et al., 2018).  
Since capital accumulation is important in supporting developing countries productivity 
growth, the developing country's government provides incentives and disincentives to increase 
it. Government incentives and disincentives for capital accumulation are influenced by a country’s 
growth phase (Fischer & Jensen, 2019). In Figure 1, we can see that in the early phase of economic 
growth, the government has to gain higher tax revenue through higher tax rates to finance public 
investment, such as infrastructure. Without higher tax revenue, the government must finance 
their primary deficit by issuing debt.  
A government needs to strike a balance between tax revenue and debt issuance. 
Government ensures that their primary deficit does not spiral out of control and maintain fiscal 
sustainability (Zubaidi et al., 2017). When a government issue debt to finance the primary deficit, 
the private sector is forced to pay higher interest rates and the economic growth may falter. This 
condition, also known as crowding out effect (Kuismanen & Kämppi, 2010).  
 





Figure 1. Economic growth life cycle phase and tax rate. 
Besides debt issuance, the government also uses tax rates to stimulate economic growth. 
As country’s public assets, such as infrastructure, become more robust and as the economy, 
taxation pool getting larger, government tax revenue is earned not from a higher tax rate but from 
a larger pool of taxable income (Besley & Persson, 2014; Mardan & Stimmelmayr, 2018).  
The government provides the incentive for the firm to use debt financing to accelerate 
firm growth. It allows the firm to reduce their tax obligation. The government treats interest 
expense as part of production cost alongside with direct material cost, direct labor cost, and 
factory overhead  cost. This government preferential treatment to firm debt financing decision 
give rise to capital structure irrelevance theorems.. 
The capital structure irrelevance theorem  (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Modigliani & Miller, 
1958) does not give preferential treatment to debt financing. Debt and equity financing are treated 
simply as the method to distribute  a firm’s profit. Hence, the proportions of debt and equity do 
not affect firm value. The theory also suggests that the government’s preferential treatment for 
debt financing relative to equity financing makes sources of financing relevant to the firm’s value. 
Higher usage of debt financing results in higher government subsidies and higher shareholder 
value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduced the financial distress 
cost to counter the benefit of debt tax saving. The improvement suggests that the optimal capital 
structure can be reached if the marginal benefit of debt tax saving equal to the marginal cost of 
financial distress cost. 
The capital structure irrelevance theorem does not differentiate between firm level and 
shareholder level tax obligation. While in the reality, the different level tax obligation gives rise to 
the classical tax regime and the integrated tax regime. Both tax regimes provide preferential 
treatment for debt financing. Interest expense is treated similar to other production costs such as 
direct material, direct labor, and factory overhead. However, the classical tax regime and the 
integrated tax regime treat shareholder dividend tax differently. The classical tax regime 
encourages firms to retain their earnings and discourage dividend payment by imposing another 
layer of taxation on the shareholder’s dividend. The classical tax regime results in double taxation 
of shareholder profit. The integrated tax regime encourages shareholder to distribute their firm 
earnings in the form of a tax free dividend. The integrated tax regime results in single taxation of 
the shareholder. 
The different treatment to dividend tax obligation give rise to two distinct paths of debt 
financing decision. The first path, debt financing decision is jointly determined with shareholder 
tax dividend. The existence of tax dividend reduces shareholder after tax return. The shareholder 
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may demand firmness to increase their debt financing usage to leverage firm level profit. Higher 
firm profit may compensate shareholder dividend tax obligation. The second path, the debt 
financing decision is determined without consideration of shareholder tax dividend. Hence, the 
firm only considers the benefit of debt tax saving after considering the financial distress cost.  
The first path implication is firm that operationally in the classical tax regime tend to have 
larger debt financing relative to firms that operating in the integrated tax regime. The second path 
implication is firm that operationally in the classical tax regime tend to have smaller debt 
financing relative to firm operating in the integrating tax regime. A firm operating in the higher 
tax rate country, as in the classical tax regime, may receive similar debt tax saving using less debt 
financing than firm operating in the lower tax rate country, as in the integrated tax regime. Based 
on these considerations, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1.  Tax regime have effect to firm financing decision.  
Since firm debt financing is influenced by firm characteristics, it is imperative to choose 
which firm characteristics that may influence the firm decision to use debt financing. Firm 
characteristics are asset tangibility, current firm growth, future firm growth, and profitability 
(Zingales & Rajan, 1995).  
Creditors usually ask for collateral as another layer of protection from a debt default. The 
collateral should have a stable value. The consensus for assets that have stable value is an asset 
that has high tangibility, such as land, buildings, and machines. The high tangibility firm may 
obtain debt financing more easily than firm with low tangibility. Based on this consideration, asset 
tangibility will have a positive relationship with firm debt financing. We measure asset tangibility 
using Net Property, Plant, and Equipment to Total Asset Ratio.  
When firm growth is higher, debt financing is a preferable source of financing relative to 
equity financing. Shareholders of a firm with larger firm growth may want to keep all the profit 
for themselves. Hence, the shareholder will be reluctant to give approval for a firm to issue new 
shares.  
We distinguish firm growth in current growth and expected future growth. Firm with 
higher current growth will demand higher working capital and investment. Based on this 
consideration, firm current growth and expected future growth will have a positive relationship 
with firm debt financing. We measure firm current growth using One Year Sales Growth and firm 
expected future growth  using Price to Book Value Ratio.  
Firm profitability has a direct effect on equity accumulation. Higher profitability will speed 
up equity accumulation assuming no dividend payouts. Higher equity value enables the firm to 
have larger borrowing capacity. Hence, profitability will have a positive relationship with debt 
financing. We measure firm profitability using Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and 
Amortization to Total Asset. 
We present the hypothesis and firm’s characteristics’ effects to debt financing decision in 
table 2.  
 
 




Table 2. Dependent variable, independent variable, control variable and their expected 
effect to firm’s debt financing decision 






1 Debt financing decision DER 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
2 Tax regime dTax 
Classical tax 
regime are 
defined as 1, and 
integrated tax 
regime are 
defined as 0. 
+/- 




Total Asset Ratio 
+ 
4 Firm’s current growth 1YSales 
One year sales 
growth relative to 
prior year sales. 
+ 
5 Firm’s expected future growth PBV 
Price to Book 
Value Ratio 
+ 





Total Asset Ratio 
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3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data 
To test our hypotheses, we choose several ASEAN countries that can be categorized as 
country with the classical tax regime and country with the integrated tax regime. The classical tax 
regime country are Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines. The integrated tax regime are Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam. We do not use the other four ASEAN countries such as Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam, and Laos due to lack of public company data consideration.   
The firm’s data is obtained from S&P Capital IQ. The criteria for firm screening in S&P 
Capital IQ are as follows: the data from year end of 2019, the firm located in ASEAN country, the 
firm operating in all industry except financial services industry, and all financial data have to be 
higher than zero. The screening results in 646 firm observation from Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam.  
 
3.2. Research Methodology 
The effect of the country tax regime on firm’s debt financing decision were tested using 
cross section regression method. We performed three cross section regressions using Stata 
statistical software. First, we test the effect of the different country tax regime on the use of debt 
financing. We define different country tax regimes using a dummy variable: classical tax regime 
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are defined as 1 and integrated tax regime are defined as 0. Firm’s debt financing is proxied by the 
Debt to Equity Ratio. Second, we test the effect of firm’s financial characteristics to the debt 
financing decision.  Third, we simultaneously test country tax regime and firm’s characteristics’ 
effect to the debt financing decision. In doing so, we were able to identify the effect from tax regime 
and the firm’s financial characteristics to firm’s debt financing decision partially and 
simultaneously.  
The proposed cross section regression model are as follows:  
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (1) 
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽21𝑌𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (2) 
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽31𝑌𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (3) 
Where 
DER =  Debt to Equity ratio 
dTax =  dummy tax regime, classical tax regime are defined as 1, integrated tax regime 
are defined as 0 
NetPPE =  Net Property, Plant, and Equipment to Total Asset ratio 
1YSales =  One year firm’s sales growth in percentage. 
PBV =  Price to Book Value ratio. 
EBITDA =  Firm’s profitability measured by Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortization to Total Asset ratio. 
i  =  Firm 
j  =  Country 
After we obtain the regression results, we perform and report the standard statistical test 
results for the cross section regression: heteroskedastic test using Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test using Stata syntax .hettest, and multicollinearity test using Value Inflation Factor 
(VIF) using Stata syntax .vif.  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Results  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of our data sample. The data sample is relatively 
diverse, from no debt firms with Debt to Equity Ratio equals or below 10% to firms in financial 
distress with Debt to Equity Ratio more than 100%. Firms operating in countries that adopt the 
classical tax regime use higher debt financing than those in countries that adopt the integrated tax 
regime. The firms in classical tax regimes have average Debt to Equity Ratio 0.70 while those in 
integrated tax regime have average Debt to Equity Ratio 0.68. However, Debt to Equity Ratio 
standard deviation in the integrated tax regime is almost twice larger than the classical tax regime. 
Hence, we need results from regression analysis to gain clearer insight on Debt to Equity Ratio in 
the classical tax regime and the integrated tax regime. 




The firms operated in the classical tax regime have higher tangibility as shown by higher, 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment to Total Asset Ratio (NetPPE), than firms operated in the 
integrated tax regime. The firms in the classical tax regime have average NetPPE 0,36 while the 
integrated tax regime have average NetPPE 0,33. 
Investors have higher firm’s future growth expectation in the classical tax regime relative 
to the integrated tax regime. Firms in the classical tax regime have average Price to Book Value 
Ratio 2.39 while the integrated tax regime have average Price to Book Value Ratio 1.85. The future 
growth expectations seems not related to firm’s current growth as measured by One Year Sales 
Growth (1YSales) and relatively the same Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and 
Amortization to Total Asset Ratio (EBITDA). The firms in the classical tax regime have 1YSales 
average 0.34 that is lower than the integrated tax regime 1YSales average 1.66. EBITDA for the 
classical tax regime and the integrated tax regime have average more or less 0.11. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 




DER 646 0,69 1,36 0,00 26,58 
NetPPE 646 0,35 0,24 0,00 0,97 
1YSales 646 0,99 15,91 0,00 402,31 
PBV 646 2,12 3,45 0,10 46,50 
EBITDA 646 0,11 0,09 0,00 0,74 
Classical Tax Regime 
DER 327 0,70 0,93 0,00 7,65 
NetPPE 327 0,36 0,26 0,00 0,93 
1YSales 327 0,34 1,97 0,00 35,06 
PBV 327 2,39 4,14 0,10 46,50 
EBITDA 327 0,11 0,08 0,00 0,74 
Integrated Tax Regime 
DER 319 0,68 1,70 0,00 26,35 
NetPPE 319 0,33 0,23 0,00 0,97 
1YSales 319 1,66 22,58 0,00 402,31 
PBV 319 1,85 2,52 0,12 24,30 
EBITDA 319 0,11 0,09 0,00 0,57 
 
Table 4 lists the cross section regression results for the effect of country tax regime on 
firm’s debt financing decision. The regression results shows that firms operating in classical tax 
regime have lower debt financing relative to those in integrated tax regimes. The dummy variable 
for tax regime (dTax) in model 1 and model 3 have value -0.2715 and -0.2773 respectively and 
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both statistically significant at alpha 5%. These findings statistically support our hypothesis that 
tax regime have effects to firm’s debt financing decisions. 
There are only one control variable that statistically significant. Firm’s asset tangibility 
have positive relations with the debt financing level. The coefficient of  NetPPE in model 2 and 
model 3 are 0.0626 and 0.0686 with alpha 10% and 5% respectively. The other control variable, 
such as current firm’s growth as proxied by One Year Sales Growth (1YSales), future firm’s growth 
as proxied by Price to Book Value Ratio (PBV), and profitability as proxied by Earnings Before 
Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization to Total Asset Ratio (EBITDA), are not statistically 
significant at alpha 10%.  
Our regression model’s explanation power of as measured by R2 is very small. Regression 
1 has an R2 equal to 0.73%, regression 2 has an R2 equal to 1.06%, and regression 3 has an R2 equal 
to 1.81%. This finding also implies that the tax regime, i.e. dummy variable, and control variable, 
i.e., firm’s characteristics, have independent effects on firm’s debt financing decision. 
Table 4. Regression results 
Descriptive Statistics 1 2 3 
dTax - 0,2715**  - 0,2773** 
NetPPE  0.0626* 0.0686** 
1YSales  0,0597 0.0606 
PBV  -0,0717 -0,5787 
EBITDA  -0,0116 - 0.0172 
Constant 0.223*** 2,6322*** 2,7368**** 
R2 0.0073 0.0106 0.0181 
n 646 646 646 
Note:  ***, **, * means significant at alpha 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
We report heteroskedastic test in table 5 and multicollinearity test in table 6. The 
heteroskedastic test have 𝜒2 larger than 0.05 or the data is homoskedastic.  Our test for 
multicollinearity using Value Inflation Factor (VIF) measures shows low multicollinearity among 
variables with average VIF 1.13.  
Table 5. Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
Description 𝝌𝟐 Prob>𝝌𝟐 
Heteroskedastic 0,24 0,6213 
 
Table 6. Test for multicollinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
dTax 1,02 0,9832 
NetPPE 1,07 0,9302 
1YSales 1,01 0,9867 
PBV 1,24 0,8057 
EBITDA 1,29 0,7748 
Mean VIF 1,13  
 
4.2. Discussion 
The classical tax regime impose two layer tax obligation: firm level and shareholder level 
tax obligation. The descriptive statistics shows that firm’s average Earnings Before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation, and Amortization to Total Asset (EBITDA) in the classical tax regime and the 
integrated tax regime are relatively the same. The classical tax regime EBITDA have average 0.11 




and the integrated tax regime have average 0.11. The shareholder level tax obligation will 
effectively reduce shareholder after tax return. However, the cross section regression results 
shows that firm in the classical tax regime have lower average Debt to Equity Ratio relative to firm 
in the integrated tax regime. 
The results suggest that firm only consider tax obligation at the firm level obligation since 
the shareholder can defer dividend tax obligation payment by reduce dividend payout ratio that 
effectively increase firm’s retained earnings. Firm also have option to distribute profit by other 
mean, i.e. share repurchase, than cash dividend. The tax rates for cash dividend is larger than tax 
rate for capital gain. Share repurchase is more tax efficient than cash dividend. Hence, tax 
obligation at the firm level is more relevant than tax obligation at the shareholder level. The 
classical tax regime have relatively higher tax rates than the integrated tax regime. Higher tax 
rates enable firm in the classical tax regime to gain equal debt tax saving to the integrated tax 
regime using lower debt financing.  
Our regression model have very low R2. This results suggest that eventhough tax regime 
is important, countries’ different institutional setting, such as economic growth phase, have more 
significant effect to explain firm’s debt financing decision. The sample shows that the classical tax 
regime and the integrated tax regime countries consist of developed and developing countries. 
The classical tax regime consist of Malaysia as developed country and Indonesia and Philippines 
as developing country. The integrated tax regime consist of Singapore as developed country and 
Vietnam and Myanmar as developing country. Our research only consider countries’ tax regime 
and not yet consider countries’ growth phase. Hence, we suggest that future research can be 
performed by analyzing the simultaneous effect of countries’ different growth phase to firm’s debt 
financing decision in the context of different tax regime. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Government may impose two layer of taxation at firm and shareholder level, i.e. the 
classical tax regime, or may impose only one layer of taxation at firm level, i.e. the integrated tax 
regime.  Tax policy is a powerful instrument for government to alter firm’s debt financing decision. 
However, as economic risk from debt financing start increasing, government reduce the incentive 
for firm to use debt financing. Tax competition also have role in reducing firm’s tax rate. 
The existence of two layer taxation may alter the firm’s debt financing decision. However, 
our cross section regression results find that firm in the classical tax regime have lower debt level 
than firm in the integrated tax regime. The results suggest firm in the classical tax regime that 
have higher tax rates have lower debt level than firm in the integrated tax regime.  Dividend 
payment is not mandatory. Firm may reduce their dividend payout ratio. Firm also have 
alternative to distribute profit beside cash dividend. Firm may distribute their profit through 
share repurchase. The tax rate for dividend tax rates is larger than the tax rate for capital gain. 
Hence, share repurchase is a tax efficient method to distribute firm’s profit. 
Eventhough country tax regime statistically have effect to firm’s debt financing decision, 
our model R2 is very small less than 2%. Countries’ different institutional setting, such as different 
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different growth phase to firm’s debt financing decision. 
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